Special Articles:

Future US Military
Force Posture:
- Korea
- Pacific
- Europe
- Global

In recent months, a debate has resurfaced comparing the merits of large versus small deck carriers in Naval Aviation.  This discussion is useful in that it reaffirms the absolute necessity of preserving and promoting a U.S. Navy large deck carrier aviation force for the foreseeable future.

The most compelling attribute of the large deck carrier is the significant firepower and flexibility that such a vessel brings to our forward presence and combat missions.  Reducing the size of existing carriers would necessitate reducing embarked air wing size as well, and with that would come degradations in all our capabilities form maritime dominance to power projection.  The air wing currently embarked on large deck carriers, like the Nimitz class, provides air power concentration and flexibility that is far superior to smaller, air-capable platforms.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Acquisition Board expressly concurred with this assessment in 1998, and has not reversed its position since that time.  No hypothetical small deck platform can come close to the potency and lethality of a large deck carrier.

For a far-flung, worldwide Navy, the importance of sea keeping cannot be overstated.  It is an immensely important characteristic based on carrier size and displacement.  A large deck carrier is better able to conduct safe air operations under significant weather and sea state conditions than a smaller version would be due to the significant advantage it possesses in physical stability.  History and hard experience have repeatedly validated this fact.  In 1972, the accident rate of smaller CV(A)/Post WWII carriers was three times higher than average accident rates today.  At the beginning of WWII, two Navy carriers, USS Ranger (CV-4) and USS Wasp (CV-7) were purposely constructed to be smaller than previous carriers, and were not only smaller but slower as well.  The slower speed of these ships prevented rapid transoceanic transit and significantly restricted their ability to respond to emergent crises as quickly or forcefully as their larger counterparts.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, PacFleet Commanders determined both of these ships were unsuitable to operate in open ocean swells and compromised the safety of flight deck operations.

During the Falklands conflict of 1982, Great Britain’s Navy employed smaller carriers with Vertical, Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft that limited the power projection and self-protection capabilities available to the Task Force Commander.  The VSTOL aircraft were limited in range and were not outfitted to perform missions beyond a limited strike and self-protect function.  Additionally, the number of possible missions was reduced by the fact that their two small carriers embarked a total of only 20 such fixed-wing aircraft.  The VSTOL assets were tasked to strike targets close at hand, carried limited ordnance and scarcely had enough fuel to return and rearm – all limits to effective sortie generation.  The limits of the VSTOL aircraft and lack of fixed-wing Airborne Early Warning (AEW) were both key factors which allowed Argentine air forces to successfully target the British fleet.  As a result, four warships, a landing ship , and one aircraft transport ship were lost, and enemy aircraft approaching at low altitudes were often undetected and never completely countered.

The complexity and comprehensive mission capability available in the current U.S. Navy air wing/large deck carrier mix allows the battle group to approach and maneuver within range of potential enemies with a comprehensive picture of both friendly and enemy forces within the battle space.  The extended reach of the large carrier’s wing applies not only to its strike capability, but also to its surveillance, electronic warfare, air-to-air warfare and air-to surface defense.  The collective advantage and synergy of placing control of all these assets on one platform makes the large deck carrier the ideal command control center for the war fightiing commander.

The sustainability and survivability of the large deck carrier is also an overwhelming advantage over any of its proposed smaller clones.  The construction of large carriers incorporates structural robustness, redundancy of critical systems and layered self-defense systems.  Larger designs also provide for the efficient use of protective schemes such as armor plating, complex compartmentation, electronic countermeasures and anti-aircraft protection systems. Smaller designs do not offer the sizing and volume flexibility to incorporate this wide range of features.

Additionally, a large carrier is inherently more sustainable than smaller counterparts due to its nuclear propulsion plant.  Forward-deployed nuclear carriers provide distinct advantages over conventionally powered alternatives.  Nuclear carriers have nearly twice the aviation  fuel storage capacity because there is no demand on space for conventional propulsion fuel.  Large nuclear carriers afford 50% more ammunition storage magazine volume for the same reason.  Nuclear platforms are therefore better able to sustain combat flight operations for extended periods of time, and there is a decreased need for underway replenishment of fuel and ammunition.  The large deck nuclear carrier is therefore less vulnerable to enemy targeting and attack because it is not as frequently constrained in its course or maneuverability during underway replenishment or by fuel conservation, and its greater speed and mobility make it both more responsive, more elusive, and therefore more effective in combat.

This same carrier debate has been conducted in the past and will likely continue to resurface again from the unsophisticated.  But the laws of physics and the violence of combat will not change; speed, mass, mobility and concentration of force remain key elements of operational effectiveness.  Therefore, this debate will continue to reach the same conclusion – our large deck carrier force is the most lethal, coherent, flexible and sustainable asset available to the President and the National Command Authority.  History, tactical analysis and critical technical review continue to reaffirm that we are on the correct course.  As our Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Vern Clark, recently said, “for now and in the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable platform anywhere in the world than an American large deck aircraft carrier.

HOME | ABOUT US | NAVAL AVIATION FORCES | EVENTS | SPECIAL ARTICLES