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BULLHORN #86
15 September 2011
ANAers!
There’s been a whale of a lot happening
– Centennial events, F-35 progress, action on the Hill,
budget issues everywhere and, most of all, our Fleet of
Naval Aviation at the pointed end of the spear as well as
showing our Flag throughout the rest of the world – all so
critical to bringing and preserving peace.
The Association is working hard with
Harris Connect to produce our ANA Centennial Membership
Directory, this one centered on the Centennial of Naval
Aviation which we all celebrate with tremendous pride! When
you get your notice to call Harris Connect, please know they
are working to produce a class product which you may
purchase if you desire.
As summer wanes and we get back to the
more normal schedules of Fall through Spring, now is the
time to rekindle squadron activities, work to renew
memberships and find new members – membership is our
lifeblood!
More, this is a time of special concern
as we see our economy faltering, our national debt soaring
out of control and our government seemingly willing to wield
a ruthless arbitrary axe on our military budget. To that
point, VADM Dunn’s latest article in USNI Proceedings,
“Naval Aviation's Second Century” at
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/naval-aviations-second-century
is very highly recommended reading. Especially note his
last few paragraphs,
“New threats will always
be with us; such is the nature of warfare. Each threat can
and will be countered. The counter may be found in the
carrier battle group itself, or it may be found elsewhere;
but found it will be, with chances being better than even
that it will come on the back of naval aviation.”
All of these
prognostications can easily be knocked into a cocked hat by
the budget, of course. If the people of the United States
and their elected representatives don’t see fit to fund the
evolutionary changes in defense that most assuredly would
come about in the natural order of things, naval aviation
will see the mid-1970s as déjà vu all over again. The nation
must not mortgage the future just to solve today’s problems.
Equally important, if
the people’s opinion of the value of the Navy continues to
be as low as opinion polls show today, all bets are off.
While it’s the duty of those in naval aviation to train,
maintain, and be ready to do whatever the nation calls on
them to do, leaders must convince U.S. citizens that naval
aviation is critically important to their welfare and the
welfare of their children for years to come. As it is now,
these naval leaders have more work to do.
Spread the word. Don’t
leave it to CHINFO. Don’t leave it to old retired people.
Active-duty leadership must get out and talk about what the
Navy, particularly naval aviation, does and can do for this
nation. Unless this happens, the budget will not provide,
and all the rest of the effort is pointless. An adequate
naval aviation budget is imperative.”
This is our clarion cry to all membership –
“Spread
the word. Don’t leave it to CHINFO- Get the Word Out! ….. An
adequate naval aviation budget is imperative!!!”
INDEX
Status of
the Navy
Reunions
Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?
The Bond Outlives the Scandal
Remember
“SEALEGS”?
All Hands Centennial of
Naval Aviation edition
Flag Officer Announcements
Growlers at War
A P3 ORION Tradition
F35 News
ARINC Supports Landing on Carrier
China's first aircraft
carrier begins sea trials
Status of the Navy
September 14, 2011
Navy Personnel
Active Duty:
327,172
Officers: 53,308
Enlisted: 269,320
Midshipmen: 4,544
Ready Reserve:
102,080 [As of 1 Aug 2011 ]
Selected Reserves: 65,117
Individual Ready Reserve: 36,963
Reserves currently mobilized:
4,454 [As of 30 Aug 2011]
Personnel on deployment:
44,489
Navy Department Civilian Employees:
203,734
Ships and Submarines
Deployable Battle Force Ships:
284
Ships Underway (away from homeport):
148 ships (52% of total)
On deployment: 113 ships (40% of total)
Attack submarines underway (away from homeport):
29 subs (54%)
On deployment:
18 subs (33%)
Ships Underway
Carriers:
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) - Atlantic
Ocean
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) - Pacific Ocean
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) - 5th Fleet
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) - 5th Fleet
Amphibious Warfare Ships:
USS Wasp (LHD 1) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Boxer (LHD 4) - Pacific Ocean
USS Bataan (LHD 5) - 5th Fleet
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) - Atlantic Ocean
USS Makin Island (LHD 8) - Pacific Ocean
Aircraft (operational):
3700+
RETURN TO INDEX
REUNIONS
The F-14 Tomcat Association
will
hold its 2011 reunion on 21-25 September at Virginia Beach,
VA. The reunion is being held in conjunction with the Oceana
Air Show and in celebration of the Centennial of Naval
Aviation. If you were ever involved in the F-14 community
you’re invited to join us. Details can be found at
http://www.f-14association.com/schedule.htm
or email Art
Martin Secretary
art@f-14association.com.
www.f-14association.com/
art@f-14association.com
USS
Enterprise Association
is celebrating both the ship's 50th year of service
(commissioned 25 November, 1961) and the 100th anniversary
of Naval Aviation.
The reunion welcomes Ship's Company,
Officers, Enlisted, Marines, Air Groups, (past and present)
and their families as well as members of USS Enterprise
(CV-6).
Reunion Dates: November 27 ~ 30, 2011
Location: Sheraton Norfolk Waterside
Hotel, 777 Waterside Dr, NORFOLK, VA 23510
The reunion plans to feature a ships
store along with a memorabilia display.
Contact and additional details: Stan
Martin, (304) 965-3988
samartin@wildblue.net
Additional details about the reunion
are posted in the Enterprise Association Newsletter (
http://www.cvan-cvn-65.org/
) and select: Newsletter 6/11
RETURN TO INDEX
*************************************************
Is Naval Aviation Culture Dead?
Issue:
Proceedings Magazine - September 2011 Vol. 137/9/1,303
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/naval-aviation-culture-dead
By John Lehman
The swaggering-flyer mystique forged over the past century
has been stymied in recent years by political correctness.
We celebrate the 100th anniversary of U.S. naval aviation
this year, but the culture that has become legend was born
in controversy, with battleship admirals and Marine generals
seeing little use for airplanes. Even after naval aviators
proved their worth in World War I, naval aviation faced
constant conflict within the Navy and Marine Corps, from the
War Department, and from skeptics in Congress. Throughout
the interwar period, its culture was forged largely unnoted
by the public.
It first burst into the American consciousness 69 years ago
when a few carrier aviators changed the course of history at
the World War II Battle of Midway. For the next three years
the world was fascinated by these glamorous young men who,
along with the Leathernecks, dominated the newsreels of the
war in the Pacific. Most were sophisticated and articulate
graduates of the Naval Academy and the Ivy League, and as
such they were much favored for Pathé News interviews and
War Bond tours. Their casualty rates from accidents and
combat were far higher than other branches of the naval
service, and aviators were paid nearly a third more than
non-flying shipmates. In typical humor, a pilot told one
reporter: “We don’t make more money, we just make it
faster.”
Landing a touchy World War II fighter on terra firma was
difficult enough, but to land one on a pitching greasy deck
required quite a different level of skill and sangfroid.
It took a rare combination of hand-eye coordination, innate
mechanical sense, instinctive judgment, accurate risk
assessment, and most of all, calmness under extreme
pressure. People with such a rare combination of talents
will always be few in number. The current generation of 9-G
jets landing at over 120 knots hasn’t made it any easier.
Little wonder that poker was a favorite recreation and
gallows humor the norm. In his book Crossing the Line,
Professor Alvin Kernan recounts when his TBF had a bad
launch off the USS Suwanee (CVE-27) in 1945. He was
trying desperately to get out of the sinking plane as the
escort carrier sped by a few feet away. Looking up, he saw
the face of his shipmate, Cletus Powell (who had just won
money from him playing blackjack), leaning out of a porthole
shouting “Kernan, you don’t have to pay. Get out, get out
for God’s sake.” No wonder such men had a certain swagger
that often irritated their non-flying brothers in arms.
Louis Johnson’s Folly
By war’s end more than 100 carriers were in commission. But
when Louis Johnson replaced the first Secretary of Defense,
Jim Forrestal—himself one of the original naval aviators in
World War I—he tried to eliminate both the Marine Corps and
naval aviation. By 1950 Johnson had ordered the
decommissioning of all but six aircraft carriers. Most
historians count this as one of the important factors in
bringing about the invasion of South Korea, supported by
both China and the Soviet Union. After that initial
onslaught, no land airbases were available for the Air Force
to fight back, and all air support during those disastrous
months came from the USS Valley Forge (CV-45), the
only carrier left in the western Pacific. She was soon
joined by the other two carriers remaining in the Pacific.
Eventually enough land bases were recovered to allow the Air
Force to engage in force, and more carriers were
recommissioned, manned by World War II vets hastily recalled
to active duty. James Michener’s The Bridges at Toko-Ri
and Admiral James Holloway’s Aircraft Carriers at War
together capture that moment perfectly. Only later was it
learned that many of the enemy pilots were battle-hardened
Russian veterans of World War II.
By the time of the armistice, the Cold War was well under
way, and for the next 43 years, naval aviation was at the
leading edge of the conflict around the globe. As before,
aviators suffered very high casualties throughout. Training
and operational accidents took a terrible toll. Jet fighters
on straight decks operating without the sophisticated
electronics or reliable ejection seats that evolved in later
decades had to operate come hell or high water as one crisis
followed another in the Taiwan Strait, Cuba, and many
lesser-known fronts. Between1953 and 1957, hundreds of naval
aviators were killed in an average of 1,500 crashes per
year, while others died when naval intelligence gatherers
like the EC-121 were shot down by North Koreans, Soviets,
and Chinese. In those years carrier aviators had only a
one-in-four chance of surviving 20 years of service.
Vietnam and the Cold War
The Vietnam War was an unprecedented feat of endurance,
courage, and frustration in ten years of constant combat.
Naval aviators flew against the most sophisticated Soviet
defensive systems and highly trained and effective
Vietnamese pilots. But unlike any previous conflict, they
had to operate under crippling political restrictions, well
known to the enemy. Antiaircraft missiles and guns were
placed in villages and other locations known to be immune
from attack. The kinds of targets that had real strategic
value were protected while hundreds of aviators’ lives and
thousands of aircraft were lost attacking easily rebuilt
bridges and “suspected truck parks,” as the U.S. government
indulged its academic game theories.
Stephen Coonts’ Flight of the Intruder brilliantly
expressed the excruciating frustration from this kind of
combat. During that period, scores of naval aviators were
killed or taken prisoner. More than 100 squadron commanders
and executive officers were lost. The heroism and horror of
the POW experience for men such as John McCain and Jim
Stockdale were beyond anything experienced since the war
with Japan.
Naturally, when these men hit liberty ports, and when they
returned to their bases between deployments, their partying
was as intense as their combat. The legendary stories of
Cubi Point, Olongapo City, and the wartime Tailhook
conventions in Las Vegas grew with each passing year.
Perhaps the greatest and least known contribution of naval
aviation was its role in bringing the Cold War to a close.
President Ronald Reagan believed that the United States
could win the Cold War without combat. Along with building
the B-1 and B-2 bombers and the Peacekeeper missile, and
expanding the Army to 18 divisions, President Reagan built
the 600-ship Navy and, more important, approved the Navy
recommendation to begin at once pursuing a forward strategy
of aggressive exercising around the vulnerable coasts of
Russia. This demonstrated to the Soviets that we could
defeat the combined Warsaw Pact navies and use the seas to
strike and destroy their vital strategic assets with
carrier-based air power.
Nine months after the President’s inauguration, three U.S.
and two Royal Navy carriers executed offensive exercises in
the Norwegian Sea and Baltic. In this and subsequent massive
exercises there and in the northwest Pacific carried out
every year, carrier aircraft proved that they could operate
effectively in ice and fog, penetrate the best defenses, and
strike all of the bases and nodes of the Soviet strategic
nuclear fleet. Subsequent testimony from members of the
Soviet General Staff attested that this was a major factor
in the deliberations and the loss of confidence in the
Soviet government that led to its collapse.
During those years naval aviation adapted to many new
policies, the removal of the last vestiges of institutional
racial discrimination, and the first winging of women as
naval aviators and their integration into ships and
squadrons.
‘Break the Culture’
1991 marked the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end
of the Cold War. But as naval aviation shared in this
triumph, the year also marked the start of tragedy. The
Tailhook Convention that took place in September that year
began a scandal with a negative impact on naval aviation
that continues to this day. The over-the-top parties of
combat aviators were overlooked during the Vietnam War but
had become accidents waiting to happen in the postwar era.
Whatever the facts of what took place there, it set off
investigations within the Navy, the Department of Defense,
the Senate, and the House that were beyond anything since
the investigations and hearings regarding the Pearl Harbor
attack. Part of what motivated this grotesquely
disproportionate witch hunt was pure partisan politics and
the deep frustration of Navy critics (and some envious
begrudgers within the Navy) of the glamorous treatment
accorded to the Navy and its aviators in Hollywood and the
media, epitomized by the movie Top Gun. Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO), chair of the House Armed Services
Committee investigation, declared that her mission was to
“break the culture,” of naval aviation. One can make the
case that she succeeded.
What has changed in naval aviation since Tailhook? First, we
should review the social/cultural, and then professional
changes. Many but not all were direct results of Tailhook.
‘De-Glamorization’ of Alcohol
Perhaps in desperation, the first reaction of Pentagon
leadership to the congressional witch hunt was to launch a
massive global jihad against alcohol, tellingly described as
“de-glamorization.” While alcohol was certainly a factor in
the Tailhook scandal, it was absolutely not a problem for
naval aviation as a whole. There was no evidence that there
were any more aviators with an alcohol problem than there
were in the civilian population, and probably a good deal
fewer.
As a group, naval aviators have always been fastidious about
not mixing alcohol and flying. But social drinking was
always a part of off-duty traditional activities like
hail-and-farewell parties and especially the traditional
Friday happy hour. Each Friday on every Navy and Marine air
station, most aviators not on duty turned up at the
officers’ club at 1700 to relax and socialize, tell bad
jokes, and play silly games like “dead bug.” But there was
also an invaluable professional function, because happy
hours provided a kind of sanctuary where junior officers
could roll the dice with commanders, captains, and admirals,
ask questions that could never be asked while on duty,
listen avidly to the war stories of those more senior, and
absorb the lore and mores of the warrior tribe.
When bounds of decorum were breached, or someone became
over-refreshed, as occasionally happened, they were usually
taken care of by their peers. Only in the worst cases would
a young junior officer find himself in front of the skipper
on Monday morning. Names like Mustin Beach, Trader Jon’s,
Miramar, and Oceana were a fixed part of the culture for
anyone commissioned before 1991. A similar camaraderie took
place in the chiefs’ clubs, the acey-deucy clubs, and the
sailors’ clubs.
Now all that is gone. Most officers’ and non-commissioned
officers’ clubs were closed and happy hours banned. A few
clubs remain, but most have been turned into family centers
for all ranks and are, of course, empty. No officers dare to
be seen with a drink in their hand. The JOs do their
socializing as far away from the base as possible, and all
because the inquisitors blamed the abuses of Tailhook ’91 on
alcohol abuse. It is fair to say that naval aviation was
slow to adapt to the changes in society against alcohol
abuse and that corrections were overdue, especially against
tolerance of driving while under the influence.
But once standards of common sense were ignored in favor of
political correctness, there were no limits to the spread of
its domination. Not only have alcohol infractions
anonymously reported on the hot-line become career-enders,
but suspicions of sexual harassment, homophobia, telling of
risqué jokes, and speech likely to offend favored groups all
find their way into fitness reports. And if actual hot-line
investigations are then launched, that is usually the end of
a career, regardless of the outcome. There is now
zero-tolerance for any missteps in these areas.
Turning Warriors into Bureaucrats
On the professional side, it is not only the zero-tolerance
of infractions of political correctness but the smothering
effects of the explosive growth of bureaucracy in the
Pentagon. When the Department of Defense was created in
1947, the headquarters staff was limited to 50 billets.
Today, 750,000 full time equivalents are on the headquarters
staff. This has gradually expanded the time and cost of
producing weapon systems, from the 4 years from concept to
deployment of Polaris, to the projected 24 years of the
F-35.
But even more damaging, these congressionally created new
bureaucracies are demanding more and more meaningless
paperwork from the operating forces. According to the most
recent rigorous survey, each Navy squadron must prepare and
submit some 780 different written reports annually, most of
which are never read by anyone but still require tedious
gathering of every kind of statistic for every aspect of
squadron operations. As a result, the average aviator spends
a very small fraction of his or her time on duty actually
flying.
Job satisfaction has steadily declined. In addition to
paperwork, the bureaucracy now requires officers to attend
mandatory courses in sensitivity to women’s issues,
sensitivity and integration of openly homosexual personnel,
and how to reintegrate into civilian society when leaving
active duty. This of course is perceived as a massive waste
of time by aviators, and is offensive to them in the
inherent assumption that they are no longer officers and
gentlemen but coarse brutes who will abuse women and gays,
and not know how to dress or hold a fork in civilian society
unless taught by GS-12s.
One of the greatest career burdens added to naval aviators
since the Cold War has been the Goldwater-Nichols
requirement to have served at least four years of duty on a
joint staff to be considered for flag, and for junior
officers to have at least two years of such joint duty even
to screen for command. As a result, the joint staffs in
Washington and in all the combatant commands have had to be
vastly increased to make room. In addition, nearly 250 new
Joint Task Force staffs have been created to accommodate
these requirements. Thus, when thinking about staying in or
getting out, young Navy and Marine aviators look forward to
far less flight time when not deployed, far more paperwork,
and many years of boring staff duty.
Zero-Tolerance Is Intolerable
Far more damaging than bureaucratic bloat is the intolerable
policy of “zero-tolerance” applied by the Navy and the
Marine Corps. One strike, one mistake, one DUI, and you are
out. The Navy has produced great leaders throughout its
history. In every era the majority of naval officers are
competent but not outstanding. But there has always been a
critical mass of fine leaders. They tended to search for and
recognize the qualities making up the right stuff, as young
JOs looked up the chain and emulated the top leaders, while
the seniors in turn looked down and identified and mentored
youngsters with promise.
By nature, these kinds of war-winning leaders make mistakes
when they are young and need guidance—and often protection
from the system. Today, alas, there is much evidence that
this critical mass of such leaders is being lost. Chester
Nimitz put his whole squadron of destroyers on the rocks by
making mistakes. But while being put in purgatory for a
while, he was protected by those seniors who recognized a
potential great leader. In today’s Navy, Nimitz would be
gone. Any seniors trying to protect him would themselves be
accused of a career-ending cover-up.
Because the best aviators are calculated risk-takers, they
have always been particularly vulnerable to the system. But
now in the age of political correctness and zero-tolerance,
they are becoming an endangered species.
Today, a young officer with the right stuff is faced on
commissioning with making a ten-year commitment if he or she
wants to fly, which weeds out some with the best potential.
Then after winging and an operational squadron tour, they
know well the frustrations outlined here. They have seen
many of their role models bounced out of the Navy for the
bad luck of being breathalyzed after two beers, or allowing
risqué forecastle follies.
‘Dancing on the Edge of a Cliff’
They have not seen senior officers put their own careers on
the line to prevent injustice. They see before them at least
14 years of sea duty, interspersed with six years of
bureaucratic staff duty in order to be considered for flag
rank. And now they see all that family separation and
sacrifice as equal to dancing on the edge of a cliff. One
mistake or unjust accusation, and they are over. They can no
longer count on a sea-daddy coming to their defense.
Today, the right kind of officers with the right stuff still
decide to stay for a career, but many more are putting in
their letters in numbers that make a critical mass of future
stellar leaders impossible. In today’s economic environment,
retention numbers look okay, but those statistics are
misleading.
Much hand-wringing is being done among naval aviators
(active-duty, reserve, and retired) about the remarkable
fact that there has only been one aviator chosen as Chief of
Naval Operations during the past 30 years. For most of the
last century there were always enough outstanding leaders
among aviators, submariners, and surface warriors to ensure
a rough rotation among the communities when choosing a CNO.
The causes of this sudden change are not hard to see.
Vietnam aviator losses severely thinned the ranks of leaders
and mentors; Tailhook led to the forced or voluntary
retirement of more than 300 carrier aviators, including many
of the finest, like Bob Stumpf, former skipper of the Blue
Angels.
There are, of course, the armchair strategists and
think-tankers who herald the arrival of unmanned aerial
vehicles as eliminating the need for naval aviators and
their culture, since future naval flying will be done from
unified bases in Nevada, with operators requiring a culture
rather closer computer geeks. This is unlikely.
As the aviator culture fades from the Navy, what is being
lost? Great naval leaders have and will come from each of
the communities, and have absorbed virtues from all of them.
But each of the three communities has its unique cultural
attributes. Submariners are imbued with the precision of
engineering mastery and the chess players’ adherence to the
disciplines of the long game; surface sailors retain the
legacy of John Paul Jones, David G. Farragut and Arleigh “31
Knot” Burke, and have been the principal repository of
strategic thinking and planning. Aviators have been the
principal source of offensive thinking, best described by
Napoleon as “L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace!”
(Audacity, audacity, always audacity!)
Those attributes of naval aviators—willingness to take
intelligent calculated risk, self-confidence, even a certain
swagger—that are invaluable in wartime are the very ones
that make them particularly vulnerable in today’s
zero-tolerance Navy. The political correctness thought
police, like Inspector Javert in Les Misérables, are
out to get them and are relentless.
The history of naval aviation is one of constant change and
challenge. While the current era of bureaucracy and
political correctness, with its new requirements of
integrating women and openly gay individuals, is indeed
challenging, it can be dealt with without compromising naval
excellence. But what does truly challenge the future of the
naval services is the mindless pursuit of zero-tolerance. A
Navy led by men and women who have never made a serious
mistake will be a Navy that will fail.
Dr. Lehman was the 65th Secretary of the Navy and a member
of the 9/11 Commission.
Return to Index
##################################
The Bond Outlives the Scandal
By Commander Ward Carroll, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In 1989, I was the editor of
Approach
magazine at the Naval Safety Center, and among my duties was
running the command’s booth at the annual Tailhook
Association Convention in Las Vegas. I arrived a day before
most of the masses and had a chance to get better acquainted
with many of the association’s officers I’d only known as
voices on the phone. They were just as helpful and
professional in person. They were sincere, and it was
obvious they loved the community and what it stood for.
Tailhook ’89 was pure joy for me. I ran into people from
all walks of my past, many of whom I hadn’t seen for years.
Catching up was exhilarating. We drank frozen concoctions by
the pool; we walked the convention floor; we attended the
panels and engaged in heated debate with our seniors,
including flag officers. And we didn’t sleep much. It seemed
like good, clean(ish) fun. By the time I flew back to
Norfolk I was sure there could never be a better forum for a
community to gather and celebrate itself.
‘A
Slightly Different Affair’
Hook ’90 was a slightly different affair, one that showed
some of the elements that would cause big problems the
following year. The Las Vegas Hilton’s third floor was
crowded—too crowded. While there was nothing mean-spirited
about anyone’s conduct in particular, the crush of people
caused unpleasant tension.
I was also struck by the enthusiastic presence of two
groups I hadn’t really noticed at Tailhook ’89: officers
attached to the training command (both instructors and
students) and Marine Corps RF-4 guys (recognizable by their
headbands festooned with rhino horns). I found it ironic
that the most boisterous of the attendees were folks who
most likely had few if any arrested landings.
Then Desert Storm happened.
Between Tailhook ’90 and ’91 the U.S. military
participated in a brief but definitive conflict that yielded
some of what the post-Vietnam generation of aviators had
been by-in-large lacking: real combat experience, which
begets real heroes. Suddenly, our peers were POWs and MiG-killers.
We weren’t just the stuff of movies. We were the stuff of
actual war—and a victory at that.
I didn’t attend Hook ’91 because I had rolled from
Approach into
another Tomcat squadron about to go to sea for six months.
But a number of my squadron-mates did, including my skipper.
They came back with the usual stories, including reports
that the Hilton’s third floor had once again been extremely
crowded. But nothing in the recounting foretold the scandal
that was about to erupt.
‘Inappropriate Conduct?’
Lieutenant Paula Coughlin complained to her boss that she
had been subject to inappropriate conduct while trying to
navigate the third floor. His “boys-will-be-boys” response
was unsatisfactory to the lieutenant, and she took her
complaint aggressively up the chain of command. It got ugly
fast, and stayed that way a lot longer than anyone could
have predicted.
As official scrutiny increased, allegations emerged that
painted a picture of barbarians rather than heroes. Several
other females corroborated the story that a “gauntlet” had
been formed along one corridor and that they had been groped
as they attempted to pass.
This wasn’t the “boys-will-be-boys” narrative that might
have been met with indifference or even tacit approval by
Pentagon officials or the general public. This was sexual
battery.
But the details remained sketchy. The Naval Investigative
Service (NIS) took a ham-fisted approach that caused the
carrier aviation community to close ranks. As is often the
case with sexual-harassment situations, the victim found
herself on the defensive. Allegations had Coughlin sleeping
with a different male each of the convention’s three nights;
she had dressed provocatively and been too drunk to identify
her attackers. Hazy factoids that floated out of the
investigation added up to next to nothing.
Amid the chaos, what struck me as most unfathomable was
that bad behavior had apparently gone completely unchecked.
Usually when animal acts turned ugly, cooler (and more
sober) heads intervened. How had this malicious wolf pack
formed (and been sustained)?
Whatever rowdy conduct the Tailhook staff and
senior-officer attendees thought might be possible from the
junior officers in the hospitality suites, it didn’t include
sexual battery. While ultimately the scandal was viewed as a
failure of senior leadership, it was actually the juniors
who let everyone else down. But absent guilty parties, that
fact was marginalized.
Old
Guard vs. Women’s Rights
The inquiries wore on, and sides formed. Old-guard
zealots were convinced the scandal was nothing more than a
land grab by opportunists looking to shake up the male-only
status quo. They squared off against the political machinery
behind the women’s rights movement and other progressive
groups convinced that all facets of the military needed to
be opened to women and that the boorish, perhaps even
criminal, conduct at Tailhook was evidence of it.
Frustration increased up the chain of command beyond the
Chief of Naval Operations that there was no clear party to
blame. Nets were cast wider. Just being at the Hilton was
implication enough. And those in positions of
authority—especially the flag officers in attendance—were
held particularly accountable.
Inevitably, the correction led to overcorrection. The
informal fabric of carrier aviation’s culture was challenged
like never before. Call-signs were reviewed for hidden
meanings or double entendres. Squadron names and logos were
modified. Hours of sensitivity training were mandated.
At the same time, in large part because of pressure
applied to the Pentagon by certain lawmakers, a
gender-integrated Navy happened in a matter of months rather
than years. Within an availability period, ships were
modified to accommodate female crew members. Training
pipelines and career tracks were changed to get female
aviators to carrier-based squadrons. And military careers
were ended. It was all too much for naval aviation’s
anti-change agents who elected to resign their commissions,
convinced that the culture had been ruined forever.
The Navy soon severed all official ties with the Tailhook
Association, and membership sagged as officers with career
aspirations feared that joining would be viewed as an act
against the Navy. “Tailhook” was reduced to a punchline for
late-night comics. There was little chance the organization
would survive.
But it did.
Tailhook Lives
I returned to the Tailhook Convention in 2005, arriving
there an hour into the Bug Roach mixer, the kick-off event.
I had retired from the Navy a few years before, which gave
me a semi-outsider’s perspective for the first time. I
studied the junior officers in the crowd, fully prepared to
find them subdued compared to those of us who’d served in
the pre-scandal Navy. It had to be tough to enjoy yourself
in a politically correct, risk-averse world.
But they were enjoying themselves, and not just in some
by-the-numbers way. The squadron esprit on display rivaled
the best I’d seen in my career. In fact, it’s fair to say
that their camaraderie was more focused, more productive
than ours had been. By this time most of the active-duty
tactical-air attendees had real war experience, something
few of us could boast during our Cold War careers. They just
skipped the sexual-battery part.
The Tailhook Association survived where lesser
organizations would have folded because of the bond among
those who’ve served in carrier aviation. That bond outlasts
the revolting conduct of a few bad actors or the judgment of
politicos who deign to care as long as it serves them. That
bond is what continues to accomplish the mission, whether
it’s putting bombs on target in Afghanistan or bringing a
Super Hornet safely back aboard the ship on a stormy night.
A few hours after the mixer wound down I awoke in my
hotel room, body still on East Coast time. I was hungry and
decided to find breakfast somewhere in the Nugget complex. I
made my way through the main casino, past dozens of
blackjack tables all jammed with players wearing flight
suits. They were going strong, laughing and high-fiving each
other after a good hand.
I checked my watch and smiled to myself. It was just
after 0500. Tailhook lived.
Return to Index
********************************
Sealegs
An old favorite, Sealegs
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3818238173215551629#
RETURN TO INDEX
********************************
All Hands Centennial of Naval Aviation edition
The link to the Centennial of Naval
Aviation edition of All Hands is =
http://www.navy.mil/media/allhands/flash/AH201107/index.html
RETURN TO INDEX
********************************
Flag Officer Announcements 
Rear Adm. (lower
half) Scott T. Craig will be assigned as commander, Strike
Force Training Atlantic, Norfolk, Va. Craig is currently
serving as deputy chief of staff fleet capabilities
requirements, concepts, and experimentation, N8/N9, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
Rear Admiral Craig graduated from Indiana University and
was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in the United States
Marine Corps in May 1982. After graduation from The Basic
School in Quantico, Va., he reported for flight training in
Pensacola, Fla., and Kingsville, Texas and was designated a
naval aviator in July 1984. Shortly after reporting to
Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101 for training in
the F-4S he was transferred to the United States Navy due to
USMC squadron over-manning, and commissioned a lieutenant
(junior grade).
At sea, he deployed with Attack Squadron 22 embarked aboard
USS
Enterprise;
Strike Fighter Squadron 27 embarked aboard USS
Kitty Hawk,
and Strike Fighter Squadron 115 as commanding officer
embarked aboard USS
Abraham Lincoln.
He commanded Carrier Air Wing 14 embarked aboard USS
John C. Stennis
and USS
Ronald Reagan.
In March 1995, Craig attended the Naval War College in
Newport, R.I., graduated with distinction and earned a
Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic
Studies.
Ashore, he served as a Defense suppression, strike warfare,
air wing training instructor and editor of the tactical
publication Aimpoint at the Naval Strike Warfare Center;
operations officer, Strike Fighter Wing Pacific Fleet; FA-18
Hornet and
Super Hornet
requirements officer on the staff of the chief of naval
operations; deputy Combined Air Operations Center director
and deputy director of Operations for Joint Task
Force-Southwest Asia at Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. On the Joint Staff, he served as chief for the
Studies, Analysis and Gaming Division, and chief of staff
and executive assistant to the director, Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment (J-8). He joined the staff of U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command and U.S. 5th Fleet in August
2008 and served as the chief of staff, and the director,
Maritime Operations Center.
Craig currently serves as deputy chief of staff for Fleet
Capabilities Requirements, Concepts, and Experimentation
(N8/N9) at United States Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
Return to Index
SOUTH CHINA SEA (July 3, 2011) The guided-missile
destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) conducts a replenishment with
the Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship
USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6). Mustin is one of seven
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers assigned to Destroyer
Squadron (DESRON) 15 and is forward-deployed to the U.S. 7th
Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Operations Specialist 3rd Class
Chin Ng/Released)
****************************************************
Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment
by Staff Writers
St. Louis, MO (SPX) Jul 13, 2011
Boeing
EA-18G Growlers operated by U.S. Navy electronic attack
squadron VAQ-132 safely returned to their home base at Naval
Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash., on July 9, after
completing an eight-month deployment that included combat
operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility.
During the
deployment, VAQ-132's personnel and aircraft supported
CENTCOM operations in Iraq before quickly transitioning to
AFRICOM to conduct operations supporting NATO in Libya.
Additional
EA-18Gs are deployed with electronic attack squadron VAQ-141
aboard the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN77) aircraft carrier,
marking the aircraft's first sea-based deployment. VAQ-141
is expected to conduct support missions as part of
Carrier Air
Wing Eight in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions.
A third
electronic attack squadron, VAQ-138, recently deployed to a
land-based location.
"It's a very
exciting accomplishment for the Navy and for our nation to
have the Growler in the fleet - on time, on cost, and with
the performance that was expected. What we're hearing from
the fleet is that the young lieutenants and lieutenant
commanders who are flying the aircraft are, just as we
thought, taking advantage of the capabilities of the Block 2
Super Hornet to make the jet more effective," said Capt.
Mark Darrah, F/A-18 and EA-18G
program manager
(PMA-265).
"We're
looking forward to more feedback from the fleet in order to
continue developing exciting capabilities for the aircraft."
"Boeing is
honored to support the Navy and the service members
operating and maintaining the new EA-18G Growler," said Kory
Mathews, Boeing F/A-18 and EA-18 Programs vice president.
"As we join the Navy in celebrating its first 100 years of
aviation success, the service continues to achieve
milestones that will stand out for decades to come."
The EA-18G is
the only air combat platform that delivers full-spectrum
airborne electronic attack (AEA) capability along with the
targeting and self-defense capabilities derived from the
Navy's
frontline
fighter, the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet.
A derivative
of the two-seat F/A-18F Block II, the EA-18G's highly
flexible design enables warfighters to operate either from
the deck of an aircraft carrier or from land-based
airfields.
It is
replacing the Navy's current AEA platform, the EA-6B
Prowler, which has been in service since 1971. The EA-18G
joined the Navy's aircraft fleet in 2008, when it was
introduced to fleet training squadron VAQ-129.
Boeing,
acting as the weapon system integrator and prime
contractor,
leads the EA-18G Growler industry team, which also includes
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Electric Aircraft
Engines.
Return to Index
A P3 ORION Tradition
Return to Index
F35 News
Following is a compilation of a number
of articles about the F-35
First Production F-35s Join Training
Wing at Eglin, FLA
Defense
Update (Qadima,
Israel, Wednesday, July 20, 2011)
by
Tamir Eshel
Home at last! A crew chief from the 33rd Fighter Wing at
Eglin AFB, FLA the first production a Lockheed Martin F-35
Lightning II aircraft to its final parking position. Photo:
Lockheed Martin
The first pair of production Lightning II aircraft deployed
to join the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin Air Force Base in
Florida. The aircraft, known as AF-9 and AF-8, will be used
to assist training F-35 pilots and maintainers who begin
coursework at the base’s new F-35 Integrated Training Center
this fall. Over the lifetime of the program, a total of 59
F-35s will compose the fighter fleet at Eglin AFB.
The two aircraft are the third and fourth production
aircraft of the F-35 family. Both are the conventional
takeoff and landing (CTOL) ‘A’ versions of the Lightning II.
Overall, the jet is the third production-model F-35
delivered to the U.S. Air Force, with the first two assigned
to Edwards AFB, Calif. It is the first aircraft delivered
from Low Rate Initial Production lot two and the seventh
F-35 delivered in program history to the Air Force.
U.S. Marine Corps pilot
Maj. Joseph T. “OD” Bachmann takes off from Ft. Worth today,
delivering the second production F-35A to join the 33rd
training wing at Eglin AFB, FLA. At Eglin the Lightning II
is joining AF-9 delivered earlier this week. Photo: Lockheed
Martin by Angel DelCueto.
Located at Eglin AFB, the fully-integrated F-35
pilot-and-maintenance training center includes pilot and
maintenance training equipment, support, systems and
facilities for all three aircraft variants. The center will
be home to a full spectrum of the latest courseware,
electronic classrooms, simulators and flight events ensuring
superior training for the next generation of pilots and
maintainers.
The F-35A CTOL variant – designed to meet U.S. Air Force
requirements – is also the primary export version of the
Lightning II. This model will serve with the U.S. Air Force
and with most foreign air forces, including Italy, the
Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway and
Israel.
The fifth Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II Short Take
Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) flight test aircraft delivered
to the Marine Corps arrives at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Patuxent River, Md., Saturday, July 16. Photo: Lockheed
Martin
To date, the three versions being tested with the F-35
program have accomplished more than 925 flights since late
2006. The latest addition to the test fleet was the fifth
F-35B Short Take Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) flight test
aircraft, delivered to the Marine Corps on Saturday this
week. The aircraft is joining the test fleet conducted by
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Patuxent River, Md. The carrier variant aircraft CF-2 began
performing Jet Blast Deflector (JBD) tests at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey. JBD testing is one
portion of the tests required to ensure the F-35C is
compatible aboard the aircraft carrier. Testing continues
with varying distances between the aircraft and JBD, and at
power settings up to and including maximum afterburner
power.
F-35C
Lightning II carrier variant aircraft CF-2 is performing Jet
Blast Deflector (JBD) tests at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey. The JBD, located behind
the catapults aboard aircraft carriers, deflects high energy
exhaust from the engine to prevent damage and injury to
other aircraft and personnel located in close proximity. JBD
testing is one portion of the tests required to ensure the
F-35C is compatible aboard the aircraft carrier. Testing
continues with varying distances between the aircraft and
JBD, and at power settings up to and including maximum
afterburner power. CF-2 arrived at Lakehurst on June 25 for
JBD tests. (Lockheed Martin photo by Andy Wolfe)
Extra $1 Billion Overrun
Estimated For F-35
(AVIATION WEEK ) ... Amy Butler
The
Pentagon estimates that the first three production lots of
the F-35 are exceeding cost projections by up to 15%, nearly
$1 billion, most of which will be paid for by the
government.
The total
estimated overrun for the 28 single-engine, stealthy
fighters in those three production lots is $918 million,
according to Joe Dellavedova, spokesman for the Joint Strike
Fighter program office. Contracts for these aircraft were
cost-plus arrangements, placing much of the burden for
overruns on the government.
The U.S.
intends to pay for $635 million—or 70%—of the projected
overage while Lockheed Martin and engine maker Pratt &
Whitney, the F-35 lead contractors, will pay for the
remaining $283 million by “reducing their target fee,”
Dellavedova says. He adds in a written statement that
another $136 million will be required “to modify early
production aircraft to attain useful service life
capabilities. F-35 concurrency is generating significant
change that both perturbs the learning cost reduction and
adds costs for modifying delivered jets.”
Lockheed
Martin spokesman Michael Rein says these numbers are “still
being scrubbed and are the worst-case scenario.” The
company, he says, is “working hard to lower it.”
However,
the joint program office is keeping the pressure on the
contractor team about price. “Going forward, controlling
costs is an absolute must,” Dellavedova says.
A
multibillion-dollar restructuring implemented this year was
designed to reduce risk from the testing plan and slow the
production ramp up in hopes of avoiding future concurrency
problems.
Including
the so-called “concurrency modifications” ($136 million),
the total overage for those aircraft on Lots 1-3 is $1.05
billion. These new costs will be reflected in a revised cost
report, called a selected acquisition report (SAR), going to
Congress in the fall. Prior to release of that report,
Pentagon procurement chief Ashton Carter will review the
program in a formal Defense Acquisition Board meeting.
As of late
last year, the targeted per-unit prices for low-rate initial
production lots 1-3 are as follows for the
conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) F-35A; the
short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (Stovl) F-35B and the
F-35C carrier version:
·
LRIP 1 — CTOL: $221.2 million
·
LRIP 2 — CTOL: $161.7 million; Stovl (first
purchase) $160.7
·
LRIP 3 — CTOL: $128.2 million; Stovl $128
million.
Meanwhile,
Lockheed Martin has begun Lot 4 production under its first
fixed-price contract with the Pentagon. Under this
arrangement, the government and contractor team equally
share the price of overruns up to 120% of the target price;
any overage beyond that is the responsibility of the
contractor.
Negotiations are under way for another fixed-price contract
for Lot 5.
The
government also is conducting a “should-cost” review of the
F-35 leading up to finalizing that contract.
110719-O-GR159-001 PATUXENT RIVER, Md. (July 19, 2011) An
F-35C test aircraft CF-3 is brought to launch position on a
test catapult by Navy test pilot Cmdr. Eric "Magic" Buus.
The test demonstrated proper catapult hook-up in preparation
for the first launches at Lakehurst, N.J., scheduled for
later this month. CF-3 is the designated carrier suitability
test aircraft. The F-35C carrier variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter is distinct from the F-35A and F-35B variants with
its larger wing surfaces and reinforced landing gear for
greater control in the demanding carrier take-off and
landing environment. The F-35C is undergoing test and
evaluation at NAS Patuxent River before eventual delivery to
the fleet. (Photo by Michael D. Jackson courtesy of Lockheed
Martin/Released)
Under Fire
Navy study looks at killing one Joint
Strike Fighter version
(AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY 29
AUG 11) ... Bill Sweetman
For the first time in the history of
the Joint Strike Fighter program, a senior Pentagon
appointee has raised the question of whether one of the
three versions of the Lockheed Martin F-35 should be
canceled to save money. The move comes as program leaders
and Pentagon cost experts are trying to prepare for a
long-delayed Defense Acquisition Board review of JSF,
including a comprehensive effort to establish reliable
predictions of acquisition and operating costs.
Navy Undersecretary Robert Work told
the Navy and Marine Corps in July to provide lower-cost
alternatives to the Navy’s current tactical aviation plan,
and to examine the consequences of terminating either the
F-35B short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (Stovl) version or
the carrier-compatible F-35C. Work is seeking decisions in
time for the 2013 budget submission.
He also directed service leaders to
study whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than
the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned (supported by 680
aircraft, divided equally between Bs and Cs) and to look at
the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned
alternative systems.
The instructions were included in a
July 7 memo from Work to Navy acquisition chief Sean
Stackley, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan
Greenert and Assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford.
Work told the leaders to form a team to develop three
alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively
representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and
$10 billion across the future-years defense plan.
Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best value
alternative, factoring in both cost and capability.”
“This relook must consider every plan
and program,” Work wrote. “Even cuts to long-planned buys of
JSF must be on the table.” The team was also tasked to
define “the key performance differences between the Block II
F/A-18E/F with all planned upgrades, F-35B and F-35C.”
The quick-look analysis was due to be
completed three weeks after the memo date; that is, by July
28. That was also the date on which Marine leadership
organized a high-profile demonstration of the F-35B’s Stovl
capability at the Navy’s Patuxent River, Md., flight test
center.
Under Work’s leadership, the Marines
and the Navy signed an agreement in March under which the
Marines would operate 80 F-35Cs and 340 F-35Bs. Earlier, the
Marines had argued that all 420 of their JSFs should be
F-35Bs.
Work did not direct the team to assess
the economic or operational impact of F-35 program changes
on the Air Force or international partners. A reduction in
Navy Department orders for both the F-35B and F-35C would
increase unit costs. Canceling either version would
eliminate some remaining development costs, mostly in flight
test, and could lead to increased production of the
surviving variant.
The largest international JSF partner,
the U.K., changed its plans in October 2010, switching from
the B to the C model. If the F-35C were to be canceled, the
U.K. would withdraw from the program and “look for a
European solution” to its requirement for a carrier fighter,
a senior U.K. official said in Washington earlier this
month. Italy is the only international partner that plans to
operate the F-35B.
Lockheed Martin declined to comment on
the memo, saying that it was an internal Navy document. The
F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) had no immediate comment.
As an analyst with the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Work coauthored studies
that supported the case for early development of a
carrier-based unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) with
greater range and better stealth characteristics than the
F-35.
Currently, there is a debate in
Washington about the characteristics of a future Navy UCAV
system. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. is still
proposing the 15,000-lb. weight class, moderately stealthy
Avenger design, while Northrop Grumman confirmed earlier
this month that it would be proposing a design similar to
its larger and stealthier X-47B. The latter would
potentially fill some of the deep-penetration missions that
the F-35C is intended to perform.
Boeing, meanwhile, is continuing to
work on an improved version of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,
which would reduce capability and performance gaps between
it and the F-35C. The company plans to conduct wind-tunnel
tests, late this year or early next, of the conformal tanks,
which add 3,000 lb. of fuel, and a centerline weapons pod.
General Electric is also offering an Enhanced Performance
Engine variant of the Super Hornet’s F414, increasing thrust
by as much as 25%.
The F-35B variant remains on probation,
under a decree issued by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates
in January. Gates said at the time that problems affecting
the aircraft—including the need for a redesigned lift-fan
door, driveshaft and clutch mechanisms—would have to be
solved without increases in cost or weight. The U.K.
government said, in switching from the B to the C variant,
that the Stovl aircraft cost more than either the F-35A or
F-35C, and U.K. government reports repeatedly described the
F-35B’s “bring-back” performance—its ability to land
vertically with fuel reserves and unused weapons—as
marginal.
Last year, Work suggested in remarks to
a Washington forum that forward basing and refueling on
improvised airstrips—one of two pillars of the Marine case
for the F-35B—would become much more hazardous in the
presence of G-RAMM (guided rockets, artillery, mortars and
missiles) threats.
The F-35B’s basing flexibility is also
being called into question by unresolved issues about the
effects of the fighter’s hot, high-velocity exhaust on
ground and deck surfaces. Lockheed Martin and senior Marine
leaders have downplayed these issues, stated that the
environment under a landing F-35B is almost identical to
that of an AV-8B Harrier, and claimed that early 2010 tests
confirmed these characteristics.
Navy construction specifications
continue to warn that the F-35B will impose temperatures as
high as 1700F (several hundred degrees higher than a Harrier
exhaust) on vertical-landing pads, with a transonic exhaust
velocity. This is enough to cause standard concrete to
“spall”—that is, shed surface flakes in a near-explosive
manner—with a 50% chance of damage on the first landing.
Navy standards require F-35B landing
pads to comprise 100 X 100-ft. slabs of special
heat-resistant concrete, poured in one piece and
continuously reinforced in two directions. At least one
contract has been issued to these specifications since early
2010, when Lockheed Martin asserted that such measures were
not necessary.
The Office of Naval Research still has
an active program to develop a cooling system for the decks
of LHD- and LHA-class ships that will carry F-35Bs,
reflecting concerns that thermal expansion and contraction
and consequent buckling will cause fatigue and premature
failure.
The JPO has not responded to repeated
inquiries about the discrepancies between Lockheed Martin’s
statements and Navy specifications. Navy engineering
organizations have referred all queries to the JPO.
The Defense Acquisition Board review is
required in order to renew Milestone B approval of the JSF
development and low-rate initial production program—granted
in 2001 but rescinded automatically after last year’s
critical breach of Nunn-McCurdy cost limits. In May, the
review was expected in June, but it was abruptly delayed
into the fall.
Any changes in the Navy’s plans will
also factor into the board’s review. Among other factors
being considered is a trend among international partners to
delay deliveries, driven by last year’s slip in the
completion of development testing, which will have an impact
on production rates, ramp-up plans and costs.
JSF test aircraft were cleared to
return to flight on Aug. 18, after a two-week grounding
caused by a failure in the integrated power pack (IPP).
Production aircraft, including two at Eglin AFB, Fla., and
F-35s being prepared for delivery at Fort Worth, remain
grounded and restricted from engine and IPP runs.
From AFA
30August2011
Unmonitored Operations Resume for Some F-35 Flights:
The F-35 joint
program office has authorized the F-35 fleet to return to
unmonitored flight operations for acceptance and ferried
flights from Lockheed Martin's production facility in Fort
Worth, Tex., to the schoolhouse at Eglin AFB, Fla., JPO
spokesman Joe DellaVedova told the Daily Report
Monday. The final decision was made on Aug. 26. The JPO,
however, still has not cleared F-35 production aircraft for
unmonitored flights beyond that, he said. The JPO grounded
the entire F-35 fleet—test and production aircraft—Aug. 3
after the integrated power package, which helps start the
engine and cool the aircraft, malfunctioned on an F-35A test
aircraft. Ground operations resumed Aug. 10 and
monitored flight operations
were authorized Aug. 18. DellaVedova said AF-8 and AF-9,
Eglin's first two F-35A production aircraft, are still
undergoing maintenance testing and awaiting flight
clearance, which is expected in the fall. There are four
production aircraft that have been sitting on Lockheed's
runway awaiting delivery. Those deliveries are expected to
occur shortly, he said.
Lockheed F-35 Fighter Has ‘Design Flaw’ in Wing Part,
Pentagon Tester Says
(BLOOMBERG NEWS 01 SEP 11) ...
Tony Capaccio
Two of three models of Lockheed Martin
Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 jet have a “design flaw” that reduces the
expected life of a wing structure to 1,200 hours, which is
“significantly less than” the expected 8,000 hours,
according to the U.S. Defense Department’s testing office.
The “defective” aluminum beam was
detected in November on Air Force and Marine Corps test
aircraft after an unrelated bulkhead crack surfaced in the
Marine Corps model, the office said. The Air Force plans to
buy 1,763 of the 2,443 total in the $382 billion U.S.
program, the Marines 371.
The flawed part is the forward root
rib, an aluminum beam at the forward-inboard corner of the
wing that supports a fuselage fairing panel on the Joint
Strike Fighter’s leading edge flap, according to Lockheed.
“Structural analysis predicted” that
the root rib will have “less than the desired fatigue life,”
Pentagon Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Michael
Gilmore said in an e- mail statement. “Its short predicted
life relative to the stated requirement is a design flaw,”
he said.
The heretofore undisclosed flaw
underscores the potential for additional cost growth and
schedule delays on the Pentagon’s largest weapons program.
Previous problems caused former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates to put the jet into an extended development phase not
scheduled to end until 2016, four years later than the
original schedule.
Wing Won’t Fail
The issue is one of long-term
durability that, were the part not fixed, would add to
maintenance and support cost. A preliminary Pentagon
estimate already pegs F-35 operating costs at as much as $1
trillion, based on a model used by 107 squadrons at 50 sites
through 2065, according to Lockheed.
The F-35 program office and Lockheed
Martin have conducted a safety assessment and concluded that
a root rib failure would not lead to wing failure, F-35
program spokesman Joseph DellaVedova said in an e-mail.
“This is not considered a serious
issue,” DellaVedova said. The program office and Lockheed
have developed retrofits and new production improvements
designed to extend the beam’s life and correct “durability
deficiencies,” he said.
“Resolving durability test findings is
a well understood process,” he said. Durability testing is
conducted early “to avoid costly sustainment later,” he
said.
The Air Force’s principle military
deputy for acquisition, Lieutenant General Mark Shackelford,
said in an interview today the “unanticipated bill” for the
fixes will likely come from program funding.
Retrofits Planned
The root rib must be redesigned for
future production aircraft, Gilmore said. Inspection and
repair procedures are being created for the existing test
and production aircraft, Gilmore said.
DellaVedova said in an e-mail statement
that about 30 Air Force and 30 Marine Corps versions will be
retrofitted. A new design will be incorporated on the
assembly line in the upcoming fifth low-rate production
contract. The Navy aircraft carrier version does not have
this durability issue, he said.
Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Laurie
Quincy said the F-35 program office statement speaks for the
company.
Shackelford said “while you don’t want
to have that type of discovery, it’s a fact of life when you
are building new aircraft.”
The defect “is not serious enough to be
a danger of a loss of a wing -- not a catastrophic failure,”
said Shackelford, a former F-22 test pilot. “But there will
be some flying-hour limit,” on current jets and “inspections
to monitor that structural member. That has some implication
in terms of our maintenance work on the aircraft.”
‘Difficult’ Fix
Gilmore said “it remains to be seen how
disruptive” retrofitting aircraft will be to the ongoing
flight test and field operations. “The needed modification
is understood to be a difficult and complex process,”
Gilmore said.
“Little durability testing has actually
been completed; therefore, more discovery is possible,”
Gilmore said.
Aircraft produced with the original
root rib “must be inspected periodically” and have required
repair before approximately 1,000 flight hours, Gilmore
said.
Durability testing of the wing area was
resumed in May but halted last month for about a week when a
crack was discovered in a predicted area of the root rib
after about 2,800 hours of testing, DellaVedova said. The
test was resumed a week later and is ongoing for completion
of 3,000 hours, he said. The crack is being monitored.
F-35 Structural Component Requires Redesign:
AFA Tuesday September 06, 2011
Thirty
Air Force F-35A and 34 Marine Corps F-35B strike fighters
built early in the aircraft's production run will require
modification to achieve their full 8,000-flight-hour design
lives, according to the F-35 Joint Program Office. That's
because program engineers identified a shortfall with a
structural component in their wings, known as the forward
root rib, according to a JPO
statement.
It's an aluminum part located where the leading edge of the
wing meets the strike fighter's fuselage. The engineers came
across this issue initially during an analytical assessment
of the F-35 airframe's fatigue life. During more recent
F-35A full-scale durability testing, a crack emerged in the
forward root rib after more than 2,800 hours that was
consistent with the analytical predictions. The JPO and
prime contractor Lockheed Martin have drafted retrofit plans
for the 64 early aircraft and they've created a redesigned
root rib that they'll incorporate for both variants at the
beginning of Lot 5 production. The root rib is not an issue
with the Navy's F-35C variant. The JPO said durability
testing helps identify structural issues early on "to avoid
costly sustainment issues later in the life of the
aircraft."
Bloomberg.com
September 13, 2011
Pentagon Buying Boeing
F-18s As Hedge Against F-35 Delays
By Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg News
The U.S. Defense Department will continue to buy Boeing Co.
F-18 fighters as a hedge against delays in producing the
Lockheed Martin Corp. F-35 jet, the Pentagon’s top weapons
buyer wrote a lawmaker this month.
“The department’s commitment to the F-35 is solid and we are
committed to production rates that minimize cost,” the
Defense Department’s undersecretary for acquisition, Ashton
Carter, wrote Texas Republican Senator John Cornyn on Sept.
1.
The Pentagon last year requested $1.9 billion for 22
additional non-stealthy F-18E/Fs and $2.6 billion more for
28 in fiscal 2012 from Chicago-based Boeing. Some of this
money came from a pool of $12 billion in F-35 funds that the
Pentagon last year cut or transferred, citing the need for
additional testing of its top weapons program.
Buying additional F-18E/Fs “was an acknowledgment” that a
delay in buying the Navy F-35 version “would slow down the
rate at which” it would reach the fleet, Carter said.
The Navy estimates it will start in 2015 seeing a shortfall
in the required number of fighters for its 11 aircraft
carriers, Carter wrote.
Still, “the F-35 is a very high priority and the production
rate will not be reduced solely to pay other bills in the
budget,” Carter wrote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta wrote Republican Senator
Saxby Chambliss of Georgia today that buying more F-18E/Fs
“was an acknowledgment of the need to maintain capacity and
capability.”
Buying additional “highly capable F/A-18E/F aircraft will
help mitigate that shortfall while we continue to ramp up
F-35 procurement,” Panetta wrote. “The F-35 is intended to
complement the F/A-18E/F, not replace it. The Navy needs the
capabilities that both aircraft provide.”
Panetta said the Pentagon’s “support for the F-35 is strong”
but the military overall tactical aircraft portfolio “is not
exempt” from the department’s ongoing overall “exhaustive
review” of roles and missions.
“We are committed to making responsible” F-35 investment
decisions that reflect program status, force structure
requirements and Department priorities,’’ he wrote.
Cornyn sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee that
today reviewed the nomination of Carter to be the next
deputy Defense secretary, to replace William Lynn.
Carter’s Sept. 1 letter to Cornyn and another, on Sept. 6,
were sent to answer the senator’s concerns that the Pentagon
wasn’t sufficiently committed to the $382 billion F-35
program, which Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin
builds in Texas.
Carter in the Sept. 6 letter sought to clarify the
Pentagon’s position on its preliminary estimate that the
F-35 is projected to cost $1 trillion in operations and
support cost through 2065, based on purchase of 2,443 jets.
“This estimate represents a projection based on an extensive
set of assumptions and historical data drawn from previous
programs adjusted to reflect the F-35’s configuration” --
not actual performance data for the joint strike fighter,
Carter said. The program office is now conducting a
“business case analysis” to sharpen the estimate, which
won’t be completed until after the fiscal 2013 budget is
submitted in February, Carter said.
The Senate defense appropriations subcommittee in its
version of the fiscal 2012 defense bill recommended today
cutting $695 million from a $9.7 billion F-35 request and
keeping production levels to 35 aircraft approved for this
year, instead of increasing to more than 40 in fiscal 2013.
“We continue to strongly support this program and believe
the F-35 is showing progress since it was restructured last
year,” the panel chairman, Hawaii Democratic Senator Daniel
Inouye said in a statement.
Still, there remains “excessive” overlap, or “concurrency”
between development and early aircraft and only 10 percent
of the testing program is complete.
·
The full Senate Appropriations Committee is
scheduled to take up the $513 billion defense spending bill
on Thursday.
AFA On Line September 14, 2011
Senate
Panel Scalps F-35 Funding, Slows Production Ramp Up:
The Senate Appropriations Committee's defense panel on
Tuesday cut $695 million from the F-35 strike fighter
program and recommended that aircraft production remains at
Fiscal 2011 levels for two more years. These moves are meant
"to limit outyear cost growth," said Sen. Daniel Inouye
(D-Hawaii), SAC chairman, in explaining the defense panel's
mark-up of the Fiscal 2012 defense appropriations bill.
Although the panel "strongly" supports the program and is
encouraged by its progress since last year's
restructuring,
it felt that "excessive concurrency in development and
production still exists," said Inouye. The defense
appropriators also were concerned that the number of
production aircraft "continues to ramp up" even though the
program is only 10 percent complete. "For each aircraft we
build this early in the test program, we will have to pay
many millions in the future to fix the problems that are
identified in testing," he said. (Senator Inouye's statement
can be found at http://appropriations.senate.gov/news.cfm?method=news.view&id=33ad4f56-b0fc-45f8-8c5b-162b5eab4791)
++++++++++++++++
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TO INDEX
ARINC Supports Landing on
Carrier
Electrical/Electronic,
Industry News,
Educational
On July
2, a U.S. Navy F/A-18D emulating an unmanned aircraft
successfully landed and took off again from the deck of the
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower under autonomous electronic
control, in the first demonstration of the Navy’s UCAS-D
technology.
Manufacturing Group August 3,
2011
The U.S. Navy program to develop carrier-based, unmanned
combat aircraft took a major step forward on July 2, when a
Navy F/A-18D surrogate aircraft, emulating an autonomous,
unmanned aircraft, successfully performed several approaches
to arrested landings on the deck of the USS Dwight D.
Eisenhower (CVN-69).
The test was the first-ever carrier landing to use new
Precision GPS and Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT)
for guidance and control that are being developed by the
Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D)
Program and its industry team including
ARINC Incorporated.
The full test covered 10 days of flights between June 27 and
July 6, using both the F/A-18 and a King Air surrogate
aircraft.
UCAS-D technology is designed to take the place of
conventional UHF voice communications for control of
unmanned carrier aircraft by the Carrier Air Traffic Control
Center (CATCC), Air Boss in the tower, and Landing Signal
Officer (LSO) on the platform. When fully integrated into
aircraft carriers, technologies developed by the UCAS-D
program have the potential to provide the digital solutions
and precision guidance through all phases of flight to
enable future unmanned combat aircraft to operate seamlessly
with manned aircraft within the Carrier Control Area (CCA)
of 50nm from the carrier.
ARINC has provided program management, engineering services,
and subject matter expertise for the Navy’s unmanned
programs since 2002. In addition to guidance and control
technology for the aircraft, the UCAS-D program requires the
upgrade and integration of six existing command and control
systems on board the carrier, and development and
integration of three new cutting-edge technology systems.
Eighteen ARINC professionals currently serve the UCAS-D
aviation/ship integration effort as team leads, engineers,
configuration managers, risk managers, and subject matter
experts to ensure Navy requirements are properly developed,
documented, understood, and implemented. “Our team of
dedicated professionals works together and with government
engineers and other contractors to ensure success,” said Ms.
Sonya Smith, ARINC SATNAV/ATCALS Program Director. “We
follow the mantra that failure is not an option.”
Three ARINC personnel served as operators on board the
Eisenhower during the 10-day UCAS-D surrogate aircraft test,
working as CATCC controllers, Air Boss, and Landing Signal
Officer (LSO). Other ARINC personnel served as Aviation/Ship
Integration (A/SI) Test Lead on the ship, Beach Detachment
Lead ashore, and PGPS Lead ashore.
ARINC Staff Principal Engineer Marty Paulaitis, who worked
the LSO platform said, “It was truly great to see the UCAS-D
approaches and landings. They came in straight, as if they
were on rails, with minimal if any perceived deviations from
their glideslope or course. The other LSOs who were watching
just turned to me and said ‘Wow!’”
The simulated unmanned landing on July 2 was historic—it was
only the second time new technology has been incorporated
for approach and landing in Carrier aviation since World War
II. Touch-and-go demonstrations were previously conducted in
2001 under the U.S. Joint Precision Approach and Landing
System (JPALS) program. Over 42 flight hours in the F/A-18
and King Air surrogates, and a total of 64 successful
approaches to touch and go or trap flying two different
approach profiles using the UCAS-D system were completed by
the time USS Eisenhower turned towards home port at the
Norfolk Navy Base.
The Navy said its July 2 exercise demonstrated cutting edge
technology for integrating the digital control of autonomous
carrier aircraft operations. Captain Jaime Engdahl, Navy
UCAS Program Manager, said the successful landing and
launching of the surrogate unmanned aircraft “allows us to
look forward to demonstrating that a tailless,
strike-fighter-sized, unmanned system can operate safely in
the carrier environment.”
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China's first aircraft carrier begins sea trials
In this photo taken on Aug. 6, 2011, a
Chinese aircraft carrier, which had been under
refurbishment, is docked at Dalian port in northeast
Liaoning province. China's first aircraft carrier started
sea trials Wednesday, Aug. 10, 2011, a step that will likely
boost concerns about the country's naval ambitions amid sea
territorial disputes. (AP Photo/Color China Photo)
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